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Introduction
Tremendous sums of money are at stake in legal gaming. More
than $300 billion was wagered legally in 1991, with casinos accounting
for $240.5 billion, lotteries $21 billion, and pari-mutuels, including
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horses, greyhounds and jai alai, $17.9 billion.1 Of the amounts wa-
gered, the gaming industry retained revenues of $26.7 billion in 1991,
with casinos accounting for $9 billion, lotteries $10.2 billion and pari-
mutuels $3.65 billion.2
The fastest-growth of legal gaming has been on Indian reserva-
tions. Between 1990 and 1991, gross wagering on Indian reservations
increased more than 100%, from $2.6 billion to $5.4 billion,3 and gross
revenues increased almost 48% from $488.6 million to $720.2 million
In contrast, spending on most other forms of gaming declined slightly
in 1991, following many years of steady increases.5
I. Development of Indian Gaming
Significant gaming on Indian reservations began in 1979, when
the Seminole Tribe of Florida became the first tribe to run a bingo
game for non-Indians. 6 A local sheriff threatened to stop the game on
grounds that it violated a Florida statute barring most forms of gam-
ing. In response to the sheriff's threat, the Seminole Tribe filed an
action in federal court for a declaratory judgment permitting gaming
to continue and injunctive relief barring the sheriff from further
threatening to intervene. The district court held that the state anti-
gambling statute could not be enforced against the Tribe and further
enjoined the sheriff from enforcing the statute. The Fifth Circuit af-
firmed.7 The court of appeals announced two important principles
governing the relations between states and tribes, both of which re-
main valid today. First, "states lack jurisdiction over Indian reserva-
tion activity until granted that authority by the federal
government .... ."8 Second, a state that has jurisdiction over Indian
1. Eugene M. Christiansen, Gross wagering handle up a mere 0.35%, to $304.1B,
INT'L GAMING & WAGERING Bus., July 15-Aug. 14, 1992, at 22,22 [hereinafter Christian-
sen, Gross Wagering].
2. Eugene M. Christiansen, Despite flat handle, U.S. gross gaming revenue rises 1.8%
to record $26.7B, INT'L GAMING & WAGERING Bus., Aug. 15-Sept. 14, 1992, at 16, 16
[hereinafter Christiansen, Flat Handle]. In contrast, Americans spent less than $5 billion
on movie tickets in 1991. Christiansen, Gross Wagering, supra note 1, at 24.
3. See Christiansen, Gross Wagering, supra note 1, at 22.
4. See Christiansen, Flat Handle, supra note 2, at 16.
5. See Christiansen, Gross Wagering, supra note 1, at 22.
6. S. REP. No. 446, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3071, 3072.
7. Seminole Tribe v. Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310, 311-12 (5th Cir. 1981).
8. Id. at 312.
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lands cannot prohibit gaming on them unless the state prohibits such
gaming throughout the state.9
Butterworth and its progeny sanctioned the explosive growth of
an Indian gaming industry immune from state regulation and lacking
substantial federal regulation. By 1988, there were more than 100 or-
ganized bingo games on Indian territories, generating over $100 mil-
lion in annual revenues for Indian tribes.10
With so much money at stake, it is not surprising that Indian gam-
ing also generated enormous controversy: law enforcement officials
feared the involvement of organized crime;" some gaming industry
executives expressed concern about new competition;' 2 state officials
complained about their inability to tax Indian games that drew cus-
tomers away from taxable non-Indian games. 3
Despite this controversy, Indian gaming still had strong support
in Congress from legislators who believed the federal government had
a moral duty to provide financial support to Indian tribes so as to
improve the lives of Native Americans. This duty stemmed princi-
pally from promises the United States made when it persuaded tribes
to cede key elements of their sovereignty and become essentially
wards of the federal government.' 4
Congress recognized Indian gaming as a practical vehicle for bet-
tering Indian life.' 5 Moreover, gaming offered the added advantage
of requiring little federal assistance at a time of deep concern over the
growing budget deficit.
By the mid-1980s, Congress had several regulatory proposals
under consideration. Trying to balance Indian and non-Indian inter-
ests, the House of Representatives passed its first Indian gaming bill
(H.R. 1920) on April 21, 1986. A product of compromise, the bill
9. Id. at 312-16 (citing United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1980)).
10. S. REP. No. 446, supra note 6, at 2, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3072.
11. See 25 U.S.C. § 2702(2) (1988); S. REP. No. 446, supra note 6, at 28, reprinted in
1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3098 (quoting letter from John R. Bolton, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S.
Dep't of Justice, to Sen. Daniel K. Inouye (Jan. 14, 1988)).
12. S. REP. No. 446, supra note 6, at 2, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3103 (quoting
Sen. John McCain).
13. Id.
14. See FELIx S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDiAN LAW 207, 220-28 (1942)
("the relation of the Indians to the United States is ... distinguished by special trust obliga-
tions requiring the United States to adhere strictly to fiduciary standards in its dealings
with Indians").
15. See 25 U.S.C. § 2701(4) (1988) ("a principal goal of Federal Indian policy is to
promote tribal economic development, tribal self-sufficiency, and strong tribal
government").
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called for a five-year moratorium on many of the most profitable
games. 6
In June 1986, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in California
v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians17 to resolve whether federal law
barred state and local governments from applying their anti-gaming
laws on Indian lands. Concerned that the Court would impose new
restrictions on Indian gaming, Indian tribes became more willing to
compromise on the House gaming bill then pending before the Sen-
ate. In contrast, opponents of Indian gaming were confident that the
Court would rule in their favor and pressed the Senate to transfer
jurisdiction over Indian gaming to the states. The bill died in the Sen-
ate, however, when no action was taken before the end of the term.'
The Supreme Court announced its decision in Cabazon in Febru-
ary 1987. The Court held that neither state nor local laws applied to
regulate Indian gaming absent explicit congressional consent. The de-
cision was more favorable to Indian tribes than either the advocates or
foes of Indian gaming had expected, and it changed the tenor of con-
gressional debate. Suddenly, Indian tribes had judicial support; states
no longer had control over Indian gaming and the federal government
had failed to regulate it. To prevent tribes from conducting essentially
unregulated gaming and to give states some control over gaming
within their borders, Congress ultimately passed the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act (IGRA) in 1988.19 IGRA reflects a complicated bal-
ancing of Indian, federal and state interests that is unusually depen-
dent on continuing good faith on all sides.
With strong congressional support, Indian gaming grew rapidly.
Many states, however, have reneged on their part of the IGRA com-
promise and have wrongly convinced federal district courts to hold
key sections of IGRA unconstitutional.
H. Structure of IGRA
IGRA divides gaming activities into three classes, each subject to
a different set of rules. Class I games are social games conducted "for
prizes of minimal value" or "traditional forms of Indian gaming" and
are regulated solely by Indian tribes.20 Class II games include bingo
16. See S. REP. No. 446, supra note 6, at 3-4, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3073-
74.
17. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
18. See S. REP. No. 446, supra note 6, at 4, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3074.
19. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1988 & Supp. 11 1991).
20. Id. §§ 2703(6), 2710(a)(1).
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and non-banking card games (i.e., games where the casino has no eco-
nomic interest in who wins or loses), which are regulated by the Na-
tional Indian Gaming Commission.2 Class II games are permitted on
Indian lands only if "located within a State that permits such gaming
for any purpose."' If, for example, a state permits charitable organi-
zations, but no other entities, to operate casino games, an Indian tribe
will be able to operate a casino game. Finally, Class III games include
"all forms of gaming that are not class I gaming or class II gaming."
23
These include slot machines, lotteries, and banking and percentage
games. Class III games are permitted on Indian lands only if "located
in a State that permits such gaming for any purpose" and if "con-
ducted in conformance with a Tribal-State compact."
' 2
Many Indian tribes have sought Tribal-State compacts authoriz-
ing them to operate lucrative Class III games. IGRA details the pro-
cedures that states and tribes must follow in negotiating such
compacts. Once a tribe requests that a state enter into negotiations,
the state is bound to negotiate "in good faith."'  Possible negotiation
subjects include: "the application of the criminal and civil laws and
regulations of the Indian tribe or the State that are directly related to,
and necessary for, the licensing and regulation of such activity;" "the
allocation of criminal and civil jurisdiction between the State and the
Indian tribe necessary for the enforcement of such laws and regula-
tions;" "standards for the operation of such activity and maintenance
of the gaming facility, including licensing;" and "any other subjects
that are directly related to the operation of gaming activities." 26
If a state refuses to negotiate, or does not negotiate in good faith,
IGRA authorizes a tribe to bring an action against the state in federal
court to compel good faith negotiations.27 The court must dismiss the
tribe's action if it concludes that the state has negotiated in good
faith. 8 If the court concludes the state has not negotiated in good
21. Id. §§ 2703(7), 2706, 2710(b)(1).
22. Id § 2710(b)(1).
23. Id. § 2703(8).
24. IM § 2710(d)(1)(B),(C).
25. Id. § 2710(d)(3)(A).
26. Id. § 2710(d)(3)(C). State taxation of Indian gaming is permitted only to the ex-
tent "necessary to defray the costs of regulating such activity." Id. §§ 2710(d)(3)(C)(iii),
2710(d)(4).
27. "The United States district courts shall have jurisdiction over, (i) any cause of ac-
tion initiated by an Indian tribe arising from the failure of a state to enter into negotiations
with the Indian tribe for the purpose of entering into a Tkibal-State compact.., or to
conduct such negotiations in good faith." Id. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i).
28. In determining whether a state has negotiated in good faith, the court "may take
into account the public interest, public safety, criminality, financial integrity, and adverse
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faith, the court must order the state and tribe to conclude a compact
within sixty days.29
If a compact is not concluded within sixty days, the state and the
tribe each must submit a proposed compact to a court-appointed me-
diator. Each party's proposed compact must represent its "last best
offer."3 The mediator then chooses one of the two proposed com-
pacts, and submits it to the state and the tribe.3' The state loses its
right to negotiate a compact if it does not consent to the mediator's
choice within sixty days of receiving it. In such a case, the Secretary of
the Interior must prescribe a compact consistent both with the com-
pact the mediator selected and with state law.32 IGRA does not allow
the state any role in administering that compact.3 On the other hand,
if the state does consent to the mediator's choice, the resulting com-
pact has the same effect as a compact entered into voluntarily.
34
Compacts entered into voluntarily must be approved by the Sec-
retary of the Interior.35 If the Secretary does not accept or reject a
compact within forty-five days of receiving it, the compact is "consid-
ered to have been approved by the Secretary" to the extent that it is
consistent with IGRA 6
HI. State Opposition to IGRA
Despite strong tribal objections, Congress, through its enactment
of IGRA, gave the states a substantial role in Class III gaming. The
tribes feared states would find ways to obstruct their games, and time
has validated their fears. When tribes have brought IGRA-sanctioned
actions in federal court against states that have failed to negotiate
gaming compacts in good faith, many states have raised "states'
rights" challenges to the constitutionality of IGRA.37 Specifically,
economic impacts on existing gaming activities, and shall consider any demand by the State
for direct taxation of the Indian tribe or of any Indian lands as evidence that the State has
not negotiated in good faith." Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii)(I)-(II).
29. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii).
30. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iv).
31. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iv), (v).
32. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(vii)(I).
33. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(vii).
34. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(vi).
35. Id. § 2710(d)(8).
36. Id. § 2710(d)(8)(C).
37. See Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. State, 3 F.3d 273 (8th Cir. 1993); Seminole
Tribe v. State, 801 F. Supp. 655 (S.D. Fla. 1992); Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indi-
am v. State, 800 F. Supp. 1484 (W.D. Mich. 1992); Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. State,
784 F. Supp. 1549 (S.D. Ala. 1992); Ponca Tribe of Indians v. State, No. 92-988-T, slip op.
(W.D. Okla. Sept. 8, 1992); Spokane Tribe of Indians v. State, 790 F. Supp. 1057 (E.D.
rVol. 21:71
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states have argued that IGRA violates the Eleventh Amendment by
unconstitutionally subjecting them to suit in federal court and violates
the Tenth Amendment by unconstitutionally requiring them to regu-
late in accordance with federal rules.38 The constitutional issues
raised by the states have divided the district courts.
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. State,39 the single appellate prece-
dent directly on point, appeared in August 1993. While it correctly
resolves the issues, it fails to provide the analytical support necessary
for a seminal constitutional decision in an important economic and
political sphere.
A. Eleventh Amendment
The Eleventh Amendment provides that "the judicial power of
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State."4 The Eleventh Amendment has been held in certain circum-
Wash. 1991); Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. State, 776 F. Supp. 550 (S.D. Ala. 1991).
"States' rights" has lately become a hot topic in the Supreme Court and is close to the core
of some of the Justices' legal philosophies. See, e.g., Ann Althouse, Variations on a Theory
of Normative Federalism: A Supreme Court Dialogue, 42 DUKE L.J. 979 (1993); Vicki C.
Jackson, The Supreme Cour4 the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98
YALE LJ. 1, 3 n.1 (1988). As the composition of the Court changes over time, however, it
remains to be seen whether "states' rights" will remain powerful.
38. One wonders how much consideration states have given to the consequences of
reneging on the IGRA compromise and invalidating the statute in court. Without IGRA,
Cabazon would leave the states no regulatory role at all, and states would be "left with the
alternative of having the federal government negotiate compacts with the tribal govern-
ments for the conduct of Class Ill gaming, and of comprehensive federal regulation of
Indian gaming." Letter from Sen. Daniel K. Inouye to Gov. John Ashcroft 2-3 (June 16,
1992) (intending to influence the 1992 National Governors' Conference).
39. 3 F.3d 273 (8th Cir. 1993).
40. U.S. CotsT. amend. XI. It is unclear whether a tribe can bring an IGRA action in
state court against a non-consenting state. The answer depends in part on whether federal
courts have exclusive jurisdiction over IGRA actions. In general, "state courts may as-
sume subject-matter jurisdiction over a federal cause of action absent provision by Con-
gress to the contrary or disabling incompatibility between the federal claim and state-court
adjudication." Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 477-78 (1981). But cf
CHARLEs A. WRM-rr ET AL., FEDERAL PRACrICE & PROCEDURE: CMvrt. § 3527, at 246-47
(1984) (quoting Note, Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts in Private Civil Actions,
70 HARv. L. Rnv. 509, 510 (1957) ("if a complaint directly requests the affirmative relief
provided by the statute, the action is considered as 'arising under' that statute and is there-
fore exclusively within the jurisdiction of the federal courts")).
If a state court has jurisdiction over an IGRA action, the state cannot invoke the
Eleventh Amendment as a defense because the Eleventh Amendment applies only to ac-
tions brought in federal court. Arguably, the state also cannot invoke its own sovereign
immunity defenses because federal law is supreme and authorizes the action against the
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stances to bar suits against a state by private parties, foreign sover-
eigns and Indian tribes.41 There are, however, three important
exceptions. First, Congress can abrogate state sovereign immunity on
behalf of third parties, including Indian tribes, under certain circum-
stances. Second, a state can consent to suit in federal court or waive
its immunity to suit, either expressly or implicitly. Third, state officials
(as opposed to states themselves) may be sued under certain circum-
stances to obtain prospective injunctive relief.42
1. Abrogation
a. Supreme Court Test
The 1991 United States Supreme Court decision in Blatchford v.
Native Village of Noatak clearly indicates that Congress can abrogate
state sovereign immunity on behalf of Indian tribes. In that case, two
Indian tribes brought an action in federal court against the State of
Alaska for changing the formula under which revenue-sharing pay-
ments were made to tribal governments. The tribes sought an order
requiring the State to pay them the money they would have received
under the old formula. The district court in Alaska "initially granted
an injunction [against the State] to preserve sufficient funds for the
1986 fiscal year, but then dismissed the suit as violating the Eleventh
Amendment."'43 The Ninth Circuit reversed, first on the ground that a
federal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1362, "constituted a congressional abroga-
tion of Eleventh Amendment immunity, and then, upon reconsidera-
tion, on the ground that Alaska had no immunity against suits by
Indian tribes."'  The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Elev-
enth Amendment bars actions by Indian tribes against states absent
state consent or congressional abrogation of state immunity.
The tribes in Blatchford raised three principal arguments against
state immunity. The first was that states waived their sovereign immu-
nity as it pertains to Indian tribes when they ratified the Constitution,
just as they had waived their immunity to actions brought by the fed-
eral government and other states.45 The Supreme Court rejected that
argument, finding that the states' surrender of immunity from suit by
state. Employees of the Dep't of Public Health & Welfare v. Dep't of Public Health &
Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 287 (1973) (recognizing the issue but not resolving it where federal
statute authorized suits "in any court of competent jurisdiction").
41. Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 111 S. Ct. 2578 (1991).
42. See Seminole Tribe, 801 F. Supp. at 657.
43. Blatchford, 111 S. Ct. at 2580.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 2582-83.
the federal government was based on the structure of the federal sys-
tem, which demands the supremacy of federal power. It found noth-
ing in the text of the Constitution or the "plan of the convention" to
suggest that Indian tribes possess similar powers.' Moreover, the
Court determined that the states' surrender of immunity from suit by
sister states was based on the mutuality of the concession.4 7 However,
it found no such mutuality exists with Indian tribes.
Indian tribes enjoy immunity against suit by states, as it would
be absurd to suggest that the tribes surrendered immunity in a
[constitutional] convention to which they were not even parties.
But if the convention could not surrender the tribes' immunity
for the benefit of the States, we do not believe that it surren-
dered the States' immunity for the benefit of the tribes.48
The second argument the tribes raised against state immunity was
that they could sue the State of Alaska because the federal govern-
ment had delegated its power to sue states to the tribes.49 The
Supreme Court rejected that argument as well. The Court acknowl-
edged that the federal government has
standing to sue on behalf of Indian tribes as guardians of the
tribes' rights, and that since "the immunity of the State is subject
to the constitutional qualification that she may be sued in this
Court by the United States," no Eleventh Amendment bar
would limit the United States' access to federal courts for that
purpose.50
But the Court denied that the federal government had delegated its
power to sue states to the tribes. The statute under which the tribes
sued the State of Alaska gives federal courts jurisdiction over all civil
actions brought by Indian tribes based on federal questions.5 ' The
Court concluded that the effect of the statute is only to permit tribes
to bring all their civil actions in federal court, regardless of the amount
in question; but the statute does not give Indian tribes the right to sue
states.52 In passing, the Court also expressed doubt as to whether the
federal government could delegate its power to void state immunity to
a third party.
53
The third argument the tribes raised was that Congress abrogated
state immunity by way of 28 U.S.C. § 1362. The Court began the anal-
46. Id. at 2582 n.2.
47. 1&. at 2582.
48. Id. (citation omitted).
49. IM. at 2583.
50. Id. at 2583.
51. 28 U.S.C. § 1362.
52. Blatchford, 111 S. Ct. at 2584.
53. Id.
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ysis of this argument by restating "a simple but stringent test: 'Con-
gress may abrogate the States' constitutionally secured immunity from
suit in federal court only by making its intention unmistakably clear in
the language of the statute."' 54 Applying this test to section 1362, the
Court found that the statute did not reflect an "unmistakably clear"
intent to abrogate immunity. "[T]he text is no more specific than [28
U.S.C.] § 1331, the grant of general federal-question jurisdiction to
district courts, and no one contends that [28 U.S.C.] § 1331 suffices to
abrogate immunity for all federal questions."'55 Blatchford makes
clear, however, that Congress can abrogate state immunity on behalf
of any entity, including but not limited to Indian tribes, as long as it
makes its intention "unmistakably clear in the language of the
statute. 56
Blatchford clarifies the Supreme Court's 1989 decision in Penn-
sylvania v. Union Gas Co.5 1 In that case, the Court ruled that Con-
gress can abrogate state sovereign immunity when it legislates
pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Clause. Justice Brennan's four-
Justice plurality opinion reasoned that Congress possessed such power
mainly by virtue of its constitutional authority to regulate interstate
commerce. His opinion added that Congress has such power when it
legislates pursuant to any plenary power. 58 Justice White, who pro-
vided the majority's fifth vote, agreed.5 9 Other federal courts have
54. Id. at 2585 (citing Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1989)).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
58. Id. at 15.
59. Id. at 57 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). The four dissenting
Justices in Union Gas criticized the majority for "muddl[ing] Eleventh Amendment juris-
prudence." Id. at 44 (Scalia, J., dissenting). They argued that any analysis of state sover-
eign immunity must recognize the "continuing validity" of Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1
(1890), which they read to hold "that the Eleventh Amendment precludes individuals from
bringing damage suits against States in federal court.. . ." Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 30
(Scalia, J., dissenting). The plurality held that Hans does not apply where Congress has the
power to abrogate state immunity. Id. at 7, 23. Justice White apparently agreed. Id. at 57
(White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (finding that Congress has authority to
abrogate state immunity under Article I, not referring to Hans).
The dissenters argued that Hans does not permit Congress to abrogate state immunity,
since Hans would mean "nothing at all" if states had to depend entirely on Congress'
goodwill to avoid being sued. Id. at 35,36 (Scalia, J., dissenting). According to the dissent-
ers, "state immunity from suit in federal courts is a structural component of federalism, and
not merely a default disposition that can be altered by action of Congress." Id. at 38
(Scalia, J., dissenting). The Union Gas dissent plays down the fact that Hans does not
address the question of whether Congress has the power to abrogate state immunity. Hans
held only that one particular statute, the Judiciary Act of 1875, did not abrogate state
r'Vol. 21:71
reached the same conclusion.' °
Blatchford resolved any doubts Union Gas may have left as to
when Congress can abrogate state immunity. All Congress must do to
abrogate state immunity is legislate pursuant to an Article I power 61
and make its intention to abrogate "unmistakably clear in the lan-
guage of the statute."' Congress' abrogation power is not confined to
legislation arising under the Interstate Commerce Clause, as some
subsequent district court decisions have wrongly held.
63
b. IGRA Abrogates State Immunity
IGRA abrogates state immunity with respect to suits brought by
Indian tribes under IGRA. Congress enacted IGRA pursuant to the
Indian Commerce Clause, an Article I power giving Congress plenary
power over Indian affairs.' 4 It is "unmistakably clear in the language
of the statute" that Congress intended in IGRA to abrogate state im-
munity by specifically providing for suits against recalcitrant states in
federal court.65
immunity. The case did not consider the broader question of whether Congress has the
power to abrogate state immunity.
The dissent also expressed concern that if Congress can abrogate state immunity
under an Article I power such as the Interstate Commerce Clause, it can abrogate state
immunity under any Article I power. Id. at 42 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Indeed, that is pre-
cisely what the Supreme Court and courts of appeal have concluded. Id. at 14-19, 57 (plu-
rality and concurring opinions); In re McVey Trucking, Inc., 812 F.2d 311, 323 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 895 (1987). As the Union Gas plurality opinion noted: "The language
of the Eleventh Amendment gives us no hint that it limits congressional authority; it refers
only to 'the judicial power' and forbids 'construfing]' that power to extend to the enumer-
ated suits-language plainly intended to rein in the Judiciary, not Congress." Union Gas,
491 U.S. at 18.
60. McVey Trucking, 812 F.2d at 323 (bankruptcy); Peel v. Florida Dep't of Transp.,
600 F.2d 1070, 1080 (5th Cir. 1979) (war powers); BV Eng'g v. University of California, 657
F. Supp. 1246, 1248 (C.D. Cal. 1987), aff'd, 858 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489
U.S. 1090 (1989) (patents, trademarks and copyrights).
61. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 15.
62. Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 111 S. Ct. 2578, 2584 (1991) (citing
Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223,227-28 (1989)); cf LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AmERicAN CON-
srrrtJToINAL LAW § 3-26, at 185-89 (2d ed. 1988).
63. See Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. State, 800 F. Supp. 1484 (W.D.
Mich. 1992); Ponca Tribe of Indians v. State, No. 92-988-T, slip op. (W.D. Okla. Sept. 8,
1992); Spokane Tribe of Indians v. State, 790 F. Supp. 1057 (E.D. Wash. 1991); Poarch
Band of Creek Indians v. State, 776 F. Supp. 550 (S.D. Ala. 1991).
64. U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
65. Seminole Tribe v. State, 801 F. Supp. 655,658 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (quoting Atascadero
State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985); citing 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i)
(giving district courts jurisdiction over "any cause of action initiated by an Indian tribe
arising from the failure of a state to enter into negotiations with the Indian tribe.., or to
conduct such negotiations in good faith")).
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c. District Court Interpretations of IGRA
Six federal district courts have addressed the question of whether
Congress had the power to abrogate state immunity in IGRA. Sur-
prisingly, only one of these decisions has correctly interpreted the con-
trolling Supreme Court case. In Seminole Tribe v. State, the court
correctly held that the State of Florida could not invoke the Eleventh
Amendment as a defense to an action to compel the state to negotiate
a gaming compact. The court applied existing precedent to hold that
Congress may abrogate state immunity whenever it legislates pursuant
to an Article I power and makes its intention to abrogate "unmistaka-
bly clear in the language of the statute."'
Other district courts have woefully misinterpreted the prece-
dent.67 The court in Spokane Tribe of Indians v. State68 cited Blatch-
ford for the proposition that states did not waive their immunity to
suit by Indian tribes at the constitutional convention. 69 That much is
true; Blatchford held that neither states nor Indian tribes waived their
immunity to the other.70 The issue, however, is whether Congress can
abrogate state immunity with respect to a suit by an Indian tribe. The
question is one of congressional power, not Indian power.
[A]lthough the lack of State-Indian mutuality may undercut the
argument that the States waived their immunity to any and all
suits by Indian tribes, the importance of that want of mutuality
is diminished when a suit is brought pursuant to explicit con-
gressional authorization, since the linchpin of abrogation must
be the nature of the power pursuant to which Congress raised
the Eleventh Amendment barrier.71
Since the Constitution gives Congress plenary power over Indian af-
fairs, Congress has the authority to abrogate state immunity with re-
spect to suits by Indian tribes.72
In upholding states' Eleventh Amendment arguments, district
courts have read Blatchford not to address the question whether Con-
gress had the power to abrogate state immunity on behalf of Indian
66. Id. at 658-61.
67. After Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 3 F.3d 273 (8th Cir. 1993), one hopes that these
decisions ultimately will be reversed or overruled on appeal. Presently, however, unneces-
sary constitutional problems and delay make it difficult for Indian tribes to obtain financ-
ing for their projects.
68. 790 F. Supp. 1057 (E.D. Wash. 1991).
69. Id. at 1061.
70. Blatchford v. Village of Noatak, 111 S. Ct. 2578, 2581 (1991).
71. Seminole Tribe, 801 F. Supp. at 663.
72. Id. at 660-61.
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tribes.73 But the Court in Blatchford held that Congress does have the
power to abrogate state immunity whenever it makes its intention
"unmistakably clear in the language of the statute."'74 The Court
would not have considered whether Congress intended to abrogate
state immunity in 28 U.S.C. § 1362 if it doubted Congress' power to
do so. The Union Gas holding, finding that Congress has the power to
abrogate state immunity whenever it legislates pursuant to an Article
I power, convincingly supports this analysis. 75
The district courts have also misinterpreted Union Gas, particu-
larly by denigrating it as a mere plurality opinion which they believe
they can ignore. 6 None of these decisions considers the effect of Jus-
tice White's concurring opinion in Union Gas or, more generally, the
binding effect of a Supreme Court plurality opinion.
The four Justices in the Union Gas plurality held that Congress
has the power to abrogate state immunity when it legislates pursuant
to any Article I power.77 Justice White agreed "that Congress had the
authority under Article I to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment im-
munity of the States." 78 Had Justice White thought otherwise, he
would have limited the power to abrogate to legislation arising under
the Interstate Commerce Clause, the constitutional provision directly
in question in Union Gas. In fact, even the four dissenters agreed that
if Congress could abrogate state immunity under the Interstate Com-
merce Clause, it could abrogate state immunity under any Article I
power.
79
However one reads the concurring and dissenting opinions, a plu-
rality opinion is just as controlling as a majority opinion.8" In Marks v.
United States,8" the Supreme Court instructed lower courts on how to
73. Even the court in Seminole Tribe, which barred the State of Florida from invoking
the Eleventh Amendment as a defense to an IGRA action, made this mistake. Id. at 663
("Blatchford is wholly silent on the principal issue raised here of congressional power to
abrogate .... ").
74. Blatchford, 111 S. Ct. at 2584 (citing Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 227-28
(1989)).
75. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 15 (1989).
76. See e.g., Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. State, 800 F. Supp. 1484,
1489 (W.D. Mich. 1992); Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. State, 776 F. Supp. 550, 558-59
(S.D. Ala. 1991).
77. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 14-19.
78. Id at 57 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice White obviously
disagreed with much of the plurality's reasoning, but he did not say why. Id.
79. Id. at 42 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
80. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 693-94 (3rd Cir. 1991), affd in part
and rev'd in part on other grounds, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
81. 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
Fall 1993"1 INDIAN GAMING REGULATORY ACrT
84 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 21:71
determine the binding effect of a plurality opinion: "When a frag-
mented court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the
result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may
be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in
the judgments on the narrowest grounds.'" ' 8  The "narrowest
grounds" on which Justice White concurred in Union Gas are that
Congress has the power to abrogate state immunity when it legislates
pursuant to any Article I power. Hence, lower courts must follow that
holding.
Several district courts have refused to follow Union Gas in IGRA
actions based on speculation that it is likely to be modified or over-
ruled. 3 They base their argument on the fact that Justices Brennan
and Marshall have been replaced by conservative Justices Souter and
Thomas, who may agree with the dissenters' position. Such personal-
ized subjective jurisprudence is improper.
The district court decisions further misinterpret Union Gas by ar-
guing that Congress cannot abrogate state immunity under the Indian
Commerce Clause, regardless of Congress' authority under the Inter-
state Commerce Clause, because the two clauses "have very different
applications."'  Not only does the argument ignore the fact that
Blatchford and Union Gas permit Congress to abrogate state immu-
nity when legislating pursuant to any Article I power, it also fails on
its own terms. Undisputedly, the Interstate and Indian Commerce
Clauses are different. The Interstate Commerce Clause maintains
"free trade among the states even in the absence of implementing fed-
eral legislation," while the Indian Commerce Clause "provide[s] Con-
gress with plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian affairs."'
But this difference is irrelevant to whether Congress has the power to
abrogate state immunity when legislating under the Indian Commerce
Clause, where its power is at least as great as its power under the
82. Id. at 193 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)). Determining
the "narrowest grounds" for a concurrence may be difficult when there are more than two
opinions in the majority. See King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The required
analysis is generally beyond the scope of this article.
83. See, e.g., Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. State, 800 F. Supp. 1484,
1489 (W.D. Mich. 1992); Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. State, 776 F. Supp. 550, 558-59
(S.D. Ala. 1991).
84. Poarch Band, 776 F. Supp. at 559 (quoting Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mex-
ico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989)); see Spokane Thbe of Indians v. State, 790 F. Supp. 1057,
1060 (E.D. Wash. 1991) (citing Cotton Petroleum).
85. Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 192.
Interstate Commerce Clause."6 Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mex-
ico, the case that the Poarch Band and Spokane Tribe courts cite as
holding otherwise, has nothing to do with the issue of Congress'
power to abrogate state immunity.87
2. Consent/Waiver
The second exception to the Eleventh Amendment is consent to
suit or waiver of immunity from suit. A tribe may bring an IGRA
action in federal court against a state that consents to suit or waives its
immunity from suit.8s Blatchford precludes a waiver based on states'
ratification of the Constitution. 9 However, if a state has entered into
an IGRA gaming compact that provides for resolution of subsequent
suits in federal court, an enforceable waiver would presumably be
found.'
3. Ex Parte Young
The third exception to the Eleventh Amendment is the Ex parte
Young doctrine that state officials may be sued to obtain prospective
injunctive relief. In Ex parte Young,91 the Supreme Court enjoined
Minnesota's Attorney General from enforcing a state law that vio-
lated the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The Attor-
86. Seminole Tribe v. State, 801 F. Supp. 655,662 n.8 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (citing, inter alia,
Wabash R. v. United States, 168 F. 1, 4 (7th Cir. 1909) ("other provisions of the Constitu-
tion which may limit the exercise of the power over interstate commerce may have no
application to foreign commerce [or Indian commerce]")).
87. Sault Ste. Marie Tribe, 800 F. Supp. at 1489; see Seminole Tribe, 801 F. Supp. 655,
662-63 (S.D. Fla. 1992). The court in Sault Ste. Marie Tribe nonetheless barred the Tribe's
IGRA action against the State of Michigan on Eleventh Amendment grounds, "both be-
cause Union Gas was a plurality opinion and because at least part of the rationale of the
Union Gas holding that Congress can abrogate state sovereign immunity when legislating
pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Clause was that states had implicitly agreed to such
regulation when forming the union." Sault Ste. Marie Tribe, 800 F. Supp. at 1489 (citations
omitted; emphasis added). As discussed above, this reasoning fails on both counts. See
supra notes 45-48, 76-82 and accompanying text.
88. Spokane Tribe, 790 F. Supp. at 1060 (acknowledging the principle, but holding that
there was no basis "to find the State has consented to be sued").
89. Blatchford v. Village of Noatak, 111 S. Ct. 2578 (1991).
90. It may even be that a state waives any claim to immunity for a federal suit based
on a failure to negotiate in good faith with one tribe if it has taken advantage of IGRA by
entering into compacts with other tribes. See Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. State, 3 F.3d
273, 280-81 (8th Cir. 1993). However, this seems contrary to existing Supreme Court pre-
cedent. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) (holding state participation
in federal programs insufficient to establish state's consent to be sued in federal court). In
any event, most cases will concern states that have not entered into any compacts and are
being sued on that very count.
91. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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ney General argued that the Court could not limit his discretion to
enforce state law. The Court accepted the principle, but said that it
did not apply to these facts. That is, because a state official has no
right to violate the United States Constitution or federal statutory law,
"[ain injunction to prevent him from doing that which he has no legal
right to do is not an interference with" his discretion. 2 A state official
who violates federal law does not share the state's immunity from suit.
Violating federal law strips the official of his "official or representa-
tive character" and subjects him "to the consequences of his individ-
ual conduct."'93
Interpreted broadly, Ex parte Young could effectively override all
states' claims of Eleventh Amendment immunity, since the penalties
imposed against the states' officials are likely to compel compliance.
The Supreme Court, however, has limited the scope of Exparte Young
by requiring a plaintiff invoking the case to satisfy three requirements.
The plaintiff must (1) allege a violation of federal law, (2) name a
state official and not the state as a defendant, and (3) request prospec-
tive injunctive relief. 4
The Ex parte Young doctrine seems to permit an Indian tribe to
bring an IGRA action against the state officials responsible for negoti-
ating a gaming compact. All the tribe must do is allege a violation of
federal law (i.e., IGRA); name state officials rather than the state as
defendants; and request only prospective injunctive relief, such as an
order requiring negotiations in good faith.
Three federal district courts have considered whether state offi-
cials can be sued under IGRA where a state cannot be sued directly.
None of these courts, however, has applied the law correctly. In Spo-
kane Tribe, the Tribe sued the State of Washington and two state offi-
cials for refusing to negotiate a gaming compact in good faith.95 The
92. Id. at 159.
93. Id. at 160. A state official "will be stripped of his authority if he acts in violation of
the United States Constitution or federal statutory law." Barnes v. Cohen, 749 F.2d 1009,
1019 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1061 (1985) (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908)); see also Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 102 (1984)
("Thus, in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), the Court emphasized that the Eleventh
Amendment bars some forms of injunctive relief against state officials for violation of fed-
eral law."); Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 673 F.2d 647, 656 (3d Cir. 1982),
rev'd on other grounds, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) ("Thus it is quite plain that the Eleventh
Amendment is no bar to the prospective injunctive relief which was ordered by the district
court insofar as that relief is predicated on constitutional or federal statutory claims.").
94. TRIBE, supra note 62, § 3-25, at 177 n.25 (2d ed. 1988) (citing, inter alia, Pennhurst
State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651
(1974); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 125 (1908)).
95. Spokane Tribe of Indians v. State, 790 F. Supp. 1057 (E.D. Wash. 1991).
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court dismissed the action against the state on grounds that it was
barred by the Eleventh Amendment, but refused to dismiss the action
against state officials because the Tribe would otherwise lack a forum
in which to bring its action.96
The Spokane Tribe court reached the right result for the wrong
reason. The fact that the Tribe could not bring an action against the
state did not, by itself, justify an action against state officials. If it did,
the Eleventh Amendment would be easily circumvented and thus ren-
dered useless. The Ex parte Young doctrine permits a plaintiff to
bring an action against state officials only when he satisfies the re-
quirements set forth by the Supreme Court. It is the Tribe's compli-
ance with those requirements, not the lack of any alternative forum,
that justifies the result in Spokane Tribe.
Another district court erroneously added two additional limita-
tions on the Ex parte Young doctrine in an IGRA action:
The first is that a suit seeking to compel a state officer to per-
form a discretionary act may not be maintained. The second is
that a suit naming a state officer which is in reality a suit against
the State is barred by the Eleventh Amendment no less than if it
had been brought against the State itself.97
In Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. State, the court held that negotiat-
ing a gaming compact "is by no means ministerial and involves discre-
tion such that an order requiring the governor to negotiate would
exceed the scope of Ex parte Young."98 It also held that the action
against the governor was the equivalent of an action against the State
of Alabama, since "the State itself would be the entity entering into
any compact the governor negotiates." 99 Thus, the court permitted
the Governor to invoke the Eleventh Amendment as a defense.1°°
The Poarch Band court cited Ex parte Young for the proposition
that a federal court cannot "control the discretion of an officer." 10'
This proposition is correct, but the court's interpretation of it is inac-
curate. In Ex parte Young, the Supreme Court held that a state offi-
cial who violates federal law is not acting within his discretion.
96. Id. at 1063.
97. Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. State, 784 F. Supp. 1549, 1551-52 (S.D. Ala.
1992).
98. Id. at 1551.
99. Id. at 1552.
100. Id. at 1551-52; see also Ponca Tribe of Indians v. State, No. 92-988-T, slip op. at 9
(W.D. Okla. Sept. 8, 1992) (following Poarch Band's reasoning).
101. Poarch Band, 784 F. Supp. at 1551. This is really a misquote of Ex parte Young,
209 U.S. 123 (1908), where the Supreme Court stated: "the court cannot control the exer-
cise of the discretion of an officer." Id. at 158.
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Similarly, a state official who violates IGRA by refusing to negotiate a
gaming compact in good faith is not acting within his discretion.
The Poarch Band court also erred in barring the action against
the Governor on the theory that it was essentially an action against
the State of Alabama. In a sense, every action against a state official
arguably is an action against the state. The effect of Ex parte Young
and its progeny is to create a narrow exception to state immunity by
permitting state officials to be sued in certain limited circumstances.
An IGRA action against a state official does not violate the Eleventh
Amendment because it fulfills the requirements the Supreme Court
established for invoking Ex parte Young."ca
B. Tenth Amendment
1. Supreme Court Test
The Tenth Amendment provides "[t]he powers not delegated to
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."' 3
Deciding whether the Tenth Amendment prohibits federal action is
the same as deciding whether another portion of the Constitution au-
thorizes the action.'04
In New York v. United States, the Court invalidated as inconsis-
tent with the Tenth Amendment a portion of the Low-Level Radioac-
tive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 ("Act"). The Act
required states to "take title" to certain radioactive waste generated
within their borders and to assume the corresponding liability if, by
1996, they did not ratify legislation entering themselves into a con-
forming interstate compact (or make appropriate internal arrange-
ments) for the disposal of such waste.
Based largely on historical analysis of fundamental differences
between the Articles of Confederation (which authorized the federal
government to exercise power over states) and the Constitution
(which authorized the federal government to exercise power directly
102. The cases that the Poarch Band court cites as holding otherwise are not on point.
In Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85 (1982), for example, the Supreme Court dismissed an inter-
pleader action involving two state officials because the officials were not charged with vio-
lating any law. Id. at 88-91. In Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89
(1984), the Court held that federal courts cannot grant prospective injunctive relief against
state officials on the basis of state-law claims. Id. at 106.
103. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
104. New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2419 (1992). New York is the key
Supreme Court case interpreting the Tenth Amendment.
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over individuals), 10 5 the Court held that, even in areas where federal
power is supreme, "Congress may not simply 'commandee[r] the legis-
lative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and
enforce a federal regulatory program.'"' The Court held that Con-
gress may instead offer states (1) "incentives" to regulate in ways
Congress deems appropriate or (2) the choice of regulating according
to federal standards or (3) preemption of state law by federal law.' °7
The critical underlying policy served by this distinction is one of polit-
ical accountability: federal officials who regulate individuals directly
would bear any resulting political fallout; they cannot be allowed to
shift the "brunt of public disapproval" to state officials by forcing
them to regulate.108 The Court concluded:
The Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or
administer a federal regulatory program.... The Constitution
enables the Federal Government to pre-empt state regulation
contrary to federal interests, and it permits the Federal Govern-
ment to hold out incentives to the States as a means of encour-
aging them to adopt suggested regulatory schemes. It does not,
however, authorize Congress simply to direct the States to pro-
vide for the disposal of the radioactive waste generated within
their borders. 0 9 "
Applying these principles, the Court unanimously held constitutional
the portion of the Act allowing states to surcharge one another for
accepting the waste and, ultimately, to deny access to other states.
The affected States are not compelled by Congress to regulate,
because any burden caused by a State's refusal to regulate will
fall on those who generate waste and find no outlet for its dispo-
sal, rather than on the State as a sovereign. A State whose citi-
105. Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in New York closely parallels her dissenting
opinion in FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 791-96 (1982). In the ten intervening years,
of course, the composition of the Court changed dramatically.
106. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2420 (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclama-
tion Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)). Congress can enact legislation that state courts are
required to apply under the Supremacy Clause. However, the Court held that "no compa-
rable constitutional provision authorizes Congress to command state legislatures to legis-
late." Id at 2430.
107. New York, 112 S. CL at 2423-24.
108. Iad at 2424.
109. Id. at 2435. The Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to preempt all state regu-
lation in the field. Cf. ia at 2419-20. The Court held:
[W]here Congress has the authority to regulate private activity under the Com-
merce Clause, we have recognized Congress' powers to offer States the choice of
regulating that activity according to federal standards or having state law pre-
empted by federal regulation. This arrangement, which has been termed "a pro-
gram of cooperative federalism," is replicated in numerous federal statutory
schemes.
Id at 2424 (citations omitted).
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zens do not wish it to attain the Act's milestones may devote its
attention and its resources to issues its citizens deem more wor-
thy; the choice remains at all times with the residents of the
State, not with Congress. The State need not expend any funds,
or participate in any federal program, if local residents do not
view such expenditures or participation as worthwhile. 10
The Court reached a contrary conclusion with respect to the
"take title" portion of the Act. It stated as follows:
The take title provision offers state governments a "choice" of
either accepting ownership of waste or regulating according to
the instructions of Congress.... On one hand, the Constitution
would not permit Congress simply to transfer radioactive waste
from generators to state governments. Such a forced transfer,
standing alone, would in principle be no different than a con-
gressionally compelled subsidy from state governments to radio-
active waste producers. The same is true of the provision
requiring the States to become liable for the generators' dam-
ages. Standing alone, this provision would be indistinguishable
from an Act of Congress directing the States to assume the lia-
bilities of certain state residents. Either type of federal action
would "commandeer" state governments into the service of fed-
eral regulatory purposes, and would for this reason be inconsis-
tent with the Constitution's division of authority between
federal and state governments. On the other hand, the second
alternative held out to state governments-regulating pursuant
to Congress' direction-would, standing alone, present a simple
command to state governments to implement legislation enacted
by Congress. As we have seen, the Constitution does not em-
power Congress to subject state governments to this type of
instruction."
2. Application to IGRA
It seems likely that the Supreme Court would hold that IGRA
does not run afoul of the Tenth Amendment, either because it re-
quires no action by states at all or because it does not impermissibly
"ccoerce" state regulation in the manner found unconstitutional in New
York v. United States.
112
Absent IGRA, states would have no right to regulate Indian gain-
110. Id. at 2427.
111 Id. at 2428.
112. The distinction between "incentives" or "encouragement," on the one hand, and
"coercion," on the other hand, is at best unclear and analytically unhelpful. As the
Supreme Court earlier said in FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982), "it cannot be
constitutionally determinative that the federal regulation is likely to move the States to act
in a given way, or even to 'coerc[e] the States' into assuming a regulatory role .... ." Id. at
766 (citation omitted).
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ing at all. 3 While cast in mandatory terms (states shall negotiate in
good faith, shall submit proposed gaming compacts to court-appointed
mediators, etc." 4), IGRA (like most portions of the Act at issue in
New York) should be read to afford states the option to choose be-
tween involving themselves in regulating Indian gaming"1 5 or ac-
cepting tribal-federal regulation with no state involvement. The Act
before the Court in New; York contained similar language ("each State
shall be responsible for providing... for the disposal of... low level
radioactive waste"' 16) that the Court found was not .mandatory. De-
spite the use of the word "shall" in the Act; the Court held that it
could avoid what otherwise might have been serious constitutional
problems by construing the language to provide incentives rather than
a mandate for state regulation.11 7 Unlike the "take title" provision in
the Act, which ultimately would require some sort of regulation by
states, IGRA allows states to abandon the field entirely to federal
(and tribal) authority. States need not regulate Indian gaming or bear
any associated expense. Accordingly, IGRA does not violate the
Tenth Amendment under the New York analysis.'
3. Judicial Interpretation of IGRA
In Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. State,119 the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that because a state can ignore a tribe's request
to negotiate, despite the availability of incentives toparticipate in ne-
gotiations, IGRA does not contravene the Tenth Amendment. 20 In
113. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
114. See, eg., 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iv) (1988).
115. The Act at issue in New York authorized states to impose what otherwise would
have been constitutionally impermissible discrimination on interstate commerce. See New
York, 112 S. Ct. at 2429.
116. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2415 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2021c(a)(1)(A)). Other parts of
the Act not quoted by the Court provided, for example, that by July 1, 1986, each state
without a disposal facility of its own "shall ratify compact legislation or, by the enactment
of legislation or the certification of the Governor, indicate its intent to develop a site for
the location of a low-level radioactive waste disposal facility within such State." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2021e(e)(1)(A) (1988) (emphasis added).
117. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2425.
118. It seems likely that Justice O'Connor would agree, given the portion of her dissent-
ing opinion in FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982), in which she expressed her view
that the regulatory scheme at issue in Hodel, under which states could choose to submit
their proposed state regulatory programs to the Secretary of the Interior for approval or
could do nothing (in which case the Secretary would develop and implement an exclu-
sively-federal program), was constitutional. FERC, 456 U.S. at 783 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
119. 3 F.3d 273 (8th Cir. 1993).
120. Id. at 281.
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so holding the court appropriately applied the New York analysis.
Outside the Eighth Circuit, only one federal district court has
considered whether IGRA compels states to regulate Indian gaming;
in Ponca Tribe of Indians v. State,12' the court held that IGRA did
compel state regulation, and thus violated the Tenth Amendment.'2
The court reasoned that "although a State will not necessarily be re-
quired to enact or enforce a regulatory program [under IGRA], the
possibility of compulsion, that a state government would be com-
manded by Congress, acting through the Secretary of the Interior, to
enact state regulation governing gaming, exists."'"
Although the Ponca Tribe court said that IGRA raised the "pos-
sibility of compulsion," the only "evidence" cited for its statement ap-
pears in a footnote suggesting that a compact prescribed by the
Secretary of the Interior might require a state to enact implementing
legislation or establish a regulatory mechanism. 124 The footnote lacks
a citation to IGRA. That is not surprising, since IGRA does not com-
pel states to regulate Indian gaming in this situation.'
s
The Tenth Amendment bars acts of Congress that compel states
to regulate. It does not bar acts of Congress that merely raise the
"possibility" that a state might be compelled to regulate. Should that
possibility become a reality, it would violate the Tenth Amendment.
But, as discussed above, IGRA does not compel states to regulate In-
dian gaming. Even if it did, the offending portion of the statute could
be voided and the rest of the statute retained. 26
Conclusion
Properly construed in accordance with existing Supreme Court
precedent, the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments do not prevent In-
dian tribes from enforcing IGRA in accordance with its terms. States
cannot invoke the Tenth Amendment as a defense because IGRA
does not compel them to regulate Indian gaming. States cannot in-
121. No. 92-988-T, slip op. (W.D. Okla. Sept. 8, 1992).
122. Id. at 12. The Ponca Tribe court implied that all of IGRA was void. This need not
be so, even if IGRA is held to violate the Tenth Amendment. Not only does IGRA specif-
ically provide for the severability of any provision held to be invalid, 25 U.S.C. § 2721
(1988), the Supreme Court in New York upheld the rest of the Act, which lacked a sever-
ability provision, after severing the "take title" incentive on the ground that the Act, as
judicially construed, gave states a choice between adopting the federal program and doing
nothing. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2434.
123. Ponca Tribe, No. 92-988-T, slip op. at 11.
124. See id at 11 n.5.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
126. See supra note 122.
[Vol. 21:71
Fal 1993] INDIAN GAMING REGULATORY ACT 93
yoke the Eleventh Amendment as a defense because Congress both
intended to abrogate state immunity in IGRA and had the power to
do so. Cases holding otherwise misinterpret both IGRA and the
United States Constitution.

